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Abstract 
 
We extend the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz to account for the 
observation that workers’ effort has a tendency to fall when they approach the end of 
their employment contract. In particular, we find that the efficiency wage increases when 
the end of term approaches for a given rate of unemployment. We draw implications for 
the behavior of workers who are approaching retirement, temporary employment 
contracts, and the advance notice of impending job loss.  
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1. Introduction 
Every employment contract has a time dimension. Workers on temporary contracts see 
their contracts expire; workers who have been given an advance notice of dismissal know 
that their days on the job are numbered; and even workers who have safe permanent jobs 
realize that they will eventually retire. In this paper we show how the expected end of 
tenure may affect workers’ effort. In particular, we extend the well-known model of wage 
setting by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) to show how a worker’s propensity to shirk his 
duties varies from the beginning to the end of an employment contract.  
The time path for the wages required to deter shirking within the Shapiro and Stiglitz 
model can help explain various real life phenomena. Young university lecturers 
frequently complain about older colleagues who are not engaged in research. Workers 
may be forced to retire at a certain age or once their productivity has started to fall and 
these individuals may then move to professions where opportunities for on-the job leisure 
are greater. Politicians sometimes end up as diplomats; football players as celebrities and 
movie stars may take on fewer roles and end up enjoying leisure and fame. In some cases 
the decision is driven by physical deterioration, such as in sports, but in other cases it is 
for other less well-defined reasons such as when an academic stops spending his time 
doing research.1  
We start by reviewing some of the evidence for the relationship between contract 
length and effort before moving to the theoretical extensions. A final section discusses 
some of the implications of the model. 
 
2. From sports to academics 
The field of sports offers an opportunity to study how performance of individuals varies 
over time. In a recent paper, Krautmann and Solow (2009) examine incentives in baseball 
contracts and find that players who are less likely to sign a subsequent contract show 
worse performance while those anticipating signing another contract perform much better. 
                                                 
1 Even in the case of athletes, the retirement decision is to some extent up to the individual’s discretion 
because the rate of deterioration of physical ability tends to be quite small. This has been demonstrated in 
many studies, such as Fair (1994, 2007) who fails to find a strong effect of aging on physical abilities.  
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Cain (2011) studies hockey players and finds that a player’s performance decreases as his 
likelihood of retirement at the end of the current contract increases.  
Another field with observable performance is politics. The voting behavior of 
politicians has been studied extensively by political scientists. One form of shirking in 
politics is to change one’s voting pattern so that it no longer conforms to the preferences 
of voters. Figlio (1995) finds that the decision to retire from politics results in changed 
political behavior or political shirking using a multi-year panel data set. Tien (2001) finds 
that shirking exists among voluntarily retiring members of Congress. Parker and Powers 
(2002) find that members of Congress who are about to leave office have a tendency to 
spend more on foreign travel. DeBacker (2012) detects shirking by senators in their last 
term that is limited by political parties that constrain the politician in his last term to a 
varying extent depending on their post-Senate career choices. This finding is supportive 
of Lott (1990) who finds that shirking can be reduced when opportunities exist for 
political parties to affect a shirking politician’s post-elective career. 
There are studies of the relationship between age and productivity in firms. Dostie 
(2006) uses Canadian data and finds that productivity profiles is concave in age. Börsch-
Supan et al. (2007) study productivity in a German car manufacturing company and find 
a negative effect of age on productivity. Lallemand and Ryckx (2009) use productivity 
data from large Belgian firms and show that a higher share of older workers lowers 
average productivity. Van Ours (2009) uses matched worker-firm data from the 
Netherlands and finds that when the average age of the workforce within a firm goes up 
productivity goes down. Göbel and Zwick (2012) analyze the impact of changes in the 
age structure of establishments on productivity using employer-employee panel data for 
the Netherlands. They find that there are no significant differences in the age-productivity 
profiles between the manufacturing and the services sectors as could be expected since 
the former may require greater physical strength. 
At the university level, there is statistical evidence showing that research productivity 
is declining in age. Oster and Hamermesh (1998) find that economists’ productivity 
measured by publications in leading journals declines with age, although the probability 
of acceptance, once an article has been submitted to a leading journal, is independent of 
age. Moreover they find that the median age of authors of articles in leading economics 
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journals was 36 in the 1980s and the 1990s and that a very small minority of authors are 
over 50 in spite of a substantial percentage of AEA members being over the age of 50.2 
However, they cannot discriminate between the two possible reasons for this observation; 
whether the falling frequency of publications is due to deteriorating mental faculties or, 
alternatively, reflects rational decisions to devote less time to research. In a recent paper, 
Jones (2010) analyses the age of individuals at the time of their greatest achievements in 
science using data on research that leads to the Nobel Prize in physics, chemistry, 
medicine and economics and also data on research that leads to great technological 
achievements as shown in the almanacs of the history of technology. He finds that the 
greatest concentration of innovations in the life of a scientist comes in the 30s but a 
substantial amount also comes in the 40s, while scientists in their 50s, and even more so 
in the 60, generate far fewer discoveries.  
We now move to the extension of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model – S-S from now on – 
and then discuss the implications of the model for wages and unemployment. 
 
3. Shirking with finite horizons  
We model a worker’s effort decision when he has finite horizons. In other words he 
realizes that the end of his contract or, alternatively, working life is gradually 
approaching. In the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) model this realization affects his decisions to 
shirk. The extension of the model will leave the infinite horizon case described in the S-S 
paper as a special case. 
There are three states of intertemporal utilities in the S-S model for workers with 
transitory probabilities to alternative states. These are the value of being employed, VE 
(when not shirking) and VS (when shirking), and the value of being unemployed, VU. 
Workers receive the wage w when employed and unemployment benefits bu when 
unemployment. Effort e  is exerted when employed workers are not shirking their duties 
while no effort is exerted when workers shirk. Workers discount future utility at rate ρ, 
                                                 
2 Similar results are reached by Lehman (1953), Diamond (1986), McDowell (1982) and Levin and Stephan 
(1992) for other disciplines. However, Jan van Ours (2009) finds no relationship between the quality-
adjusted rate of publication and age among his colleagues at Tilburg University.  
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face a constant probability of job termination b during the contract period and the 
probability q of being fired if shirking. 
We start with a representative state i  
      ( ) ( )s ti itV u s e dsρ
∞
− −
= ∫ ,                                            (1) 
with transitory probability pij of moving to the alternative state jV ,where ( )iu s  is the 
immediate utility at time s for the state i. We can now introduce finite horizons by 
dividing the inter-temporal integral iV into the periods of t time T≤ ≤  and T time≤ ≤ ∞ : 
         ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Ts t s t s ti i i it t TV u s e ds u s e ds u s e dsρ ρ ρ
∞ ∞
− − − − − −
= = +∫ ∫ ∫ .                (2) 
The integral ( ) ( )s tiT u s e dsρ
∞
− −∫  for time period T time≤ ≤ ∞  can be rewritten as follows 
        ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )s t T t s Ti iT Tu s e ds e u s e dsρ ρ ρ
∞ ∞
− − − − − −
=∫ ∫ .                            (3) 
Therefore, we need to discount the integral by the factor ( )ijp T te− −  if we would like to 
replace T with t since over the time period from t to T, the integral ( ) ( )s TiT u s e dsρ
∞
− −∫  
depreciates at the rate of pij: 
     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )ijp T tT t s T s ti iT te u s e ds e u s e ds
ρρ ρ ρ∞ ∞− + −− − − − − −
=∫ ∫ .                    (4) 
Equation (2) can now be rewritten as 
     ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ij ijT p T t p T ts t s t Ti i i i it tV u s e ds e u s e ds V e V
ρ ρρ ρ∞− + − − + −− − − −
= + = +∫ ∫ ,        (5) 
where ( ) ( )T s tTi itV u s e dsρ− −= ∫ . Rearranging gives 
      ( )( ) .1 ij
T
i
i p T t
VV
e ρ− + −
=
−
                                                (6) 
Equation (6) shows the relationship between the perpetual and non-perpetual 
intertemporal integrals for the state i. One can then apply equation (6) to three states: EV , 
SV , and UV , with corresponding transitory probabilities: pEU = b, pSU = b+q, and pUE = a, 
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where ( ) ( )T s tTE tV w e e dsρ− −= −∫  is the non-perpetual integral for the value of being a non-
shirking employed worker who faces the probability b of moving to the unemployed state, 
( )T s tT
S t
V we dsρ− −= ∫  is the non-perpetual integral for the value of being a shirking worker 
who faces the probability b+q of moving to the unemployment state and 
( )T s tT
U ut
V b e dsρ− −= ∫  is the non-perpetual integral for an unemployed worker who becomes 
employed with probability a, which denotes the probability of finding jobs. 
We can derive the following three asset pricing equations by substituting equation (6) 
into the Bellman equations of the perpetual case of the S-S model; 
        ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )11 1
b T t
b T tT T T
E U Ea T t
eV w e e b V V
e
ρ
ρ
ρρ
− + −
− + −
− + −
⎛ ⎞
−
= − − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
−⎝ ⎠
,                      (7) 
         ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )11 1
b q T t
b q T tT T T
S U Sa T t
eV w e b q V V
e
ρ
ρ
ρρ
− + + −
− + + −
− + −
⎛ ⎞
−
= − + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
−⎝ ⎠
,                    (8) 
         ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )11 1
a T t
a T tT T T
U u E Ub T t
eV b e a V V
e
ρ
ρ
ρρ
− + −
− + −
− + −
⎛ ⎞
−
= − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
−⎝ ⎠
.                      (9) 
Using the no-shirking condition such that T TE SV V= for equation (8) gives 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )11 1
b q T t
b q T tT T T
E U Ea T t
eV w e b q V V
e
ρ
ρ
ρρ
− + + −
− + + −
− + −
⎛ ⎞
−
= − + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
−⎝ ⎠
.                (10) 
There are three unknown variables, TEV , 
T
UV , w , for (7), (9) and (10). Rearranging those 
three equations gives 
        ( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1
1
b T t
b T t b T tT T
E Ua T t
eb V b V w e e e
e
ρ
ρ ρ
ρρ
− + −
− + − − + −
− + −
⎛ ⎞
−
+ − − − = − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
−⎝ ⎠
,   (11) 
        ( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )( )1 1 0
1
b q T t
b q T tT T
E Ua T t
eb q V b q V w e
e
ρ
ρ
ρρ
− + + −
− + + −
− + −
⎛ ⎞
−
+ + − + − − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
−⎝ ⎠
,        (12) 
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( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 11
a T t
a T tT T
E U ub T t
ea V a V b e
e
ρ
ρ
ρ ρ
− + −
− + −
− + −
⎛ ⎞
−
− + = − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
−⎝ ⎠
,           (13) 
Finally, using Cramer’s rule gives the no-shirking condition for wages (see Appendix for 
details) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
1
,
1
u uB A ea b q b b b q B A b q e a b qw
B A b a aq q
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
− + − + + + + + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
=
− + + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦    
 (14) 
where ( )( )( )1 b T tA e ρ− + −= −  and ( )( )( )1 b q T tB e ρ− + + −= − . Note that since A < B we find that 
(1 – B/A) is negative. The numerator of (14) falls faster than the denominator and the firm 
needs to pay wages that rise as the end of the contract period approaches. Because the 
effective discount rates for the shirking state is b qρ + +  and higher than the effective 
discount rate for the non-shirking state bρ + , shirking is less harmful to workers whose 
contract will expire soon.  
For the perpetual case, we have A=B. Thus the no-shirking condition becomes  
 ( ) ( )b q e a b q euw b e a buq q
ρ ρ ρ
ρ
ρ
+ + + +
= = + + + +  ,                      (15) 
which is the original no-shirking condition of Shapiro and Stiglitz. 
 
4.  Retirement  
The derivation above can be used to model age-dependent wage setting. Lazear (1979) 
proposed the idea that older workers who were promised rising wage profiles at the 
beginning of their job tenure end up with wages exceeding their productivity which then 
calls for their mandatory retirement.3 In our extension of the S-S model we find that 
expected remaining tenure is finite and older workers will either have to be paid more or 
face higher unemployment rates in order to induce them not to shirk. The higher wages 
are necessary not because rising wage profiles are used to create incentives throughout 
                                                 
3 Sala-I-Martin (1995) offered a related economic rationale for mandatory retirement. In his model, 
mandatory retirement serves the purpose of preventing older, low-productivity workers from lowering the 
productivity of their younger colleagues in the workplace. 
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one’s career as in Lazear (1981) but because only at a higher wage do they refrain from 
shirking realising how short their remaining tenure is. 
Denote the number of employed workers of age t by Lt. In steady state, the outflow 
from employment to unemployment equals bLt and should equal to inflow of workers 
from unemployment to employment a(Nt-Lt) where Nt is the number of workers of age t 
in the labor force. 
     ( )t t tbL a N L= − .                                                   (16) 
Thus ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1t t t t t t t t t ta b bL N L b bN N L bN N L b u− − −+ = − + = − = − =  and we find  
( )1 t ta b u u= − . Substituting back into (14) gives the no-shirking condition in 
equilibrium as a relationship between wages and unemployment. 
                  
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1 1
.
1 1 1
t t u
t t t t
u t
t t t t
B A eb u u b q b b b q
w
B A b b u u b u u q q
B A b q e b u q
B A b b u u b u u q q
ρ
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
⎡ ⎤
− − + − + +⎣ ⎦
= ⎡ ⎤
− + + − + − +⎣ ⎦
+ + +
+ ⎡ ⎤
− + + − + − +⎣ ⎦
      (17)    
It follows that each cohort of workers has a distinct wage curve – or no-shirking 
constraint – described by equation (17).  
The non-shirking constraint is drawn in Figure 1 below as an upward-sloping wage 
curve or a non-shirking constraint for different age groups. The benchmark values are 
given below the figure  
                                           Figure 1.  Age-dependent wage curves 
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5. Conclusions 
We have shown how, for a given wage and rate of unemployment, workers put less value 
on their jobs the shorter their remaining tenure is. This increases their incentive to shirk 
their duties, which then requires firms to raise wages at a given level of unemployment. 
The same intuition applies to the analysis of temporary contracts and young workers with 
short expected job tenures. The shorter the contract, the lower is the value of the job to 
the worker and the more likely is he to shirk his duties. Similarly, a worker who has been 
given an advance notice of impending job loss is likely to lower his effort, which could 
explain why advance notice is not more common.5  
                                                 
5 See Kuhn (1992) and Addison and Chilton (1997). 
10 
 
References 
 
Addison, John T. and John B. Chilton (1997), “Nondisclosure as a Contract Remedy: 
Explaining the Advance-Notice Puzzle,” Journal of Labor Economics, 15 (1), 143-164. 
 
Börsch-Supan, A., I. Duzgun, and M. Weiss (2007), “Age and Productivity in Work 
Teams: Evidence from the Assembly Line,” MEA Discussion Paper, University of 
Mannheim. 
 
Cain, Luke D. (2011), “Shirking in the National Hockey League,” Manuscript, Union 
College, New York. 
 
DeBacker, Jason (2012), “Political Parties and Political Shirking,” Public Choice, 150 (3-
4), 651-670. 
 
Diamond, Arthur (1986), “The Life-Cycle Research Productivity of Mathematicians and 
Scientists,” Journal of Gerontology, 41, 520-525. 
 
Dostie, B. (2006), „Wages, Productivity and Aging,“ Working Paper Institute of Applied 
Economics, Montreal. 
 
Fair, Ray C. (1994), “How Fast Do Old Men Slow Down?” The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 76 (1), 103-118. 
 
Fair, Ray (2007), “Estimated Age Effects in Athletic Events and Chess,” Experimental 
Aging Research, 33 (1), 37-57. 
 
Figlio, David N. (1995), “The Effect of Retirement On Political Shirking: Evidence From 
Congressional Voting,” Public Finance Review, 23 (2), 226-241. 
 
Göbel, Christian and Thomas Zwick (2012), “Age and Productivity: Sector Differences,” 
De Economist, 160 (1), 35-57. 
 
Jones, Benjamin F. (2010), “Age and Great Invention,” The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, XCII (1), 1-14. 
 
Krautmann, Anthony C. and John L. Solow (2009), “The Dynamics of Performance Over 
the Duration of Major League Baseball Long-Term Contracts,” Journal of Sports 
Economics, 10 (1), 6-22. 
 
Kuhn, Peter (1992), “Mandatory Notice,” Journal of Labor Economics, 10 (2), 117-137. 
 
Lallemand, T. and F. Ryckx (2009), “Are Older Workers Harmful for Firm 
Productivity?” De Economist, 157, pp. 273–292. 
 
11 
 
Lazear, Edward P. (1979), “Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?” The Journal of 
Political Economy, 87 (6), 1261-1284. 
 
Lazear, Edward P. (1981), “Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours 
Restrictions,” American Economic Review, 71, 606-620. 
 
Lehman, Harvey (1953), Age and Achievement, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Levin, Sharon and Paula Stephan (1992), Striking the Mother Lode in Science, New York: 
Oxford. 
 
Lott, John R. (1990), “Attendance Rates, Political Shirking, and the Effect of Post-
Elective Office Employment,” Economic Inquiry, 28, 133-150. 
 
McDowell, John (1982), “Obsolescence of Knowledge and Career Publication Profiles,” 
American Economic Review, 72, 752-768. 
 
Oster, Sharon M. and Daniel S. Hamermesh (1998), “Aging and Productivity Among 
Economists,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 80 (1), 154-156. 
 
Parker, Glenn R. and Stephen C. Powers (2002), “Searching for Symptoms of Political 
Shirking: Congressional Foreign Travel,” Public Choice, 110 (1-2), 173-191). 
 
Sala-I-Martin (1992), “Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?,” NBER Working Paper 
No. W4186. 
 
Shapiro, Carl and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1984), “Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker 
Discipline Device,” American Economic Review, 74 (3), 433-44. 
 
Tien, Charles (2001), “Representation, Voluntary Retirement, and Shirking in the Last 
Term,” Public Choice, 106 (1-2), 117-130. 
 
Van Ours, Jan C. (2009), “Will you still need me – when I’m 64?” De Economist, 157, 4, 
441-460. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Appendix 
Equations (11)-(13) can be written as follows: 
(A1) ( ) T TE UAb V b V Aw AeCρ + − − = − , 
(A2) ( ) ( ) 0T TE UBb q V b q V BwCρ + + − + − = , 
(A3) ( )T TE U uCa V a V CbA ρ− + = − , 
where ( )( )( )1 b T tA e ρ− + −= − , ( )( )( )1 b q T tB e ρ− + + −= − , and ( )( )( )1 a T tC e ρ− + −= − . 
Cramer’s rule gives the solutions for no-shirking conditions wages 
 
(A4)                       
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
0
.
0
u
Ab b Ae
C
Bb q b q
C
Ca a Cb
Aw
Ab b A
C
Bb q b q B
C
Ca a
A
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
+ − −
+ + − +
− + −
=
+ − −
+ + − + −
− +
 
 
Expanding the determinants gives 
(A5)  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) .
u uBb b b q Ae b q a Bae b q Abb b qw
A b q a Bab Ba b q B b a
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
+ + + + + + − + − + +
=
+ + + + − + − + +
 
 
Equation (A5) can further be simplified as follows, 
 
(A6)  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
  
1
  .
1
u u
u u
u u
B A b b b q Bb q A B ea b q Ae a b q
w
A B b a aq A q
A B ea b q b b b q Bb q Ae a b q
A B b a aq A q
B A ea b q b b b q B A b q e a b q
B A b a aq q
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
− + + + + − + + + + +
=
− + + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
− + − + + + + + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
=
− + + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
− + − + + + + + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
=
− + + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 
